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Abstract
This paper is concerned with a non-zero sum differential game problem of an anticipated forward-
backward stochastic differential delayed equation under partial information. We establish a necessary
maximum principle and sufficient verification theorem of the game system by virtue of the duality and
convex variational method. We apply the theoretical results and stochastic filtering theory to study a
linear-quadratic game system and derive the explicit form of the Nash equilibrium point and discuss the
existence and uniqueness in particular cases. As an application, we consider a time-delayed pension fund
manage problem with nonlinear expectation and obtain the Nash equilibrium point.
Keywords. Stochastic differential game, maximum principle, stochastic differential delayed equation,
linear-quadratic problem, partial information, g-expectation.
1 Introduction
The general nonlinear backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) were first developed by Pardoux
and Peng [1], and have been widely applied in optimal control, stochastic games, mathematical finance
and related fields. If a BSDE coupled with a forward stochastic differential equation (SDE), it is called
the forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE). In stochastic control area, the form of the
classical Hamiltonian system is one of the FBSDEs. The classical Black-Scholes option pricing formula in
the financial market can be deduced by certain FBSDE. Systems based on BSDEs or FBSDEs have been
widely surveyed by many authors, see Peng [2, 29], Karoui, Peng, and Quenez [36], and Yong [3], etc.
In classical case, there are many phenomena that have the nature of past-dependence, i.e. their behavior
not only depends on the situation at the present time, but also on their past history. Such models were
identified as stochastic differential delayed equations (SDDEs), which are a natural generalization of the
classical SDEs and have been widely studied in engineering, life science, finance, and other fields (see for
example, Mohammed [4], Arriojas, Hu, Monhammed, and Pap [5]). Recently, Chen and Wu [16] studied a
stochastic control problem based on SDDE. When introducing the adjoint equation, they need some new
typed of BSDEs, which had been introduced by Peng and Yang [17] for the general nonlinear case and
called anticipated BSDEs (ABSDEs), which also play an important role in finance and insurance (see e.g.
Delong [7]). Moreover, a class of BSDEs with time-delayed generators (BSDDEs) has also been studied (see
Wu and Wang [32], Shi and Wang [33], Wu and Shu [6]). In addition, Chen and Wu [26], Huang, Li, and
Shi [8] studied a linear quadratic (LQ) case based on a coupled SDDE and ABSDE called the anticipated
forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation (AFBSDDE).
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Game theory has been pervading the economic theory, attracts more and more research attentions.
Game theory was firstly introduced by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [9]. Nash [10] made the fundamental
contribution in Non-cooperate Games and gave the classical notion of Nash equilibrium point. Recent years,
many articles on stochastic differential game problems driven by stochastic differential equations appeared.
Researchers try to consider the strategy on multiple players rather than one player and try to find an
equilibrium point rather than an optimal control. These problems are more complex than the classical
control problems but much closer to social and behavior science. Yu [13] solved the LQ game problem on
forward and backward system. Øksendal and Sulem [11], Hui and Xiao [12] made a research on the maximum
principle of forward-backward system. Chen and Yu [14] studied the maximum principle of a SDDE case,
Shi and Wang [33], Wu and Shu [6] discussed a BSDDE case.
In reality, instead of complete information, there are many cases the controller can only obtains partial
information, reflecting in mathematics that the control variable is adapted to a smaller filtration. Based on
this phenomenon, Xiong and Zhou [15] dealt with a Mean-Variance problem in financial market that the
investor’s optimal portfolio is only based on the stock and bond process he observed. This assumption of
partial information is indeed natural in financing market. Recently, Wu and Wang [32], Wu and Shu [6] also
considered the partial information case.
From above discussion, we believe that the research on general AFBSDDEs and their wide applications
in mathematical finance is important and fascinating. To our best knowledge, there are quite lacking
in literature. Recently, Huang and Shi [27] discussed the optimal control problem based on AFBDDE
system. Our work distinguished itself from above one in the following aspects. First, we study the stochastic
differential game rather than the stochastic control system. Second, we study more practical cases that the
available information to the players are partial. Third, we get a worthwhile results about the solution of the
LQ case by filtering equation and solve a practical problem in financial market.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we give some necessary notions and state some
preliminary results. in section 3, we establish a necessary condition (maximum principle) and a sufficient
condition (verification theorem) for the Nash equilibrium point. In section 4, we apply the theory discussed
in Section 3 to study a linear-quadratic game problem and obtain a result of the existence and uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium point in particular cases. In section 5, we study a financial problem and obtain an explicit
equilibrium point.
2 Preliminary results
Throughout this article, we denote by Rk the k-dimensional Euclidean space, Rk×l the collection of k × l
matrices. For a given Euclidean space, we denote by 〈·, ·〉(resp. | · |) the scalar product(resp. norm). The
superscript τ denotes the transpose of vectors or matrices.
Let (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P) be a complete filtered probability space equipped with a d + d¯-dimensional, Ft-
adapted standard Brownian motion (W (·), W¯ (·)), where F = FT . E
Ft [·] = E[·|Ft] denotes the conditional
expectation under natural filtration Ft and fx(·) denotes the partial derivative of function f(·) with respect
to x. Let T > 0 be the finite time duration and 0 < δ < T be the constant time delay. Moreover, we denote
by C([−δ, 0];Rk) the space of uniformly bounded continuous function on [−δ, 0], by LpF (Ω;R
k) the space
of F -measurable random variable ξ satisfying E|ξ|p < ∞ for any p ≥ 1, and by LpF (r, s;R
k) the space of
Rk-valued Ft-adapted processes ϕ(·) satisfying E
∫ s
r
|ϕ(t)|pdt <∞) for any p ≥ 1.
We consider the following AFBSDDE:
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

dxv(t) = b(t, xv(t), xvδ (t), v1(t), v2(t))dt+ σ(t, x
v(t), xvδ (t), v1(t), v2(t))dW (t)
+ σ¯(t, xv(t), xvδ (t), v1(t), v2(t))dW¯ (t),
−dyv(t) = f(t, xv(t), yv(t), zv(t), z¯v(t), yvδ+(t), v1(t), v2(t)))dt
− zv(t)dW (t) − z¯v(t)dW¯ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xv(t) = ξ(t), t ∈ [−δ, 0],
yv(T ) = G(xv(T )), yv(t) = ϕ(t), t ∈ (T, T + δ].
(2.1)
Here (xv(t), yv(t), zv(t), z¯v(t)) : Ω× [−δ, T ]× [0, T + δ]× [0, T ]× [0, T ], b : Ω× [0, T ]×Rn×Rn×Rk1 ×Rk2 →
Rn, σ : Ω × [0, T ] × Rn × Rn × Rk1 × Rk2 → Rn×d, σ¯ : Ω × [0, T ] × Rn × Rn × Rk1 × Rk2 → Rn×d¯,
f : Ω × [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rm×d × Rm×d¯ × Rm × Rk1 × Rk2 → Rm, G : Ω × Rn → Rn are given
continuous maps, xvδ (t) = x
v(t− δ), yv
δ+
(t) = EFt [yv(t+ δ)], ξ(·) ∈ C([−δ, 0];Rn) is the initial path of xv(·),
ϕ(·) ∈ L2F (T, T + δ;R
m) is the terminal path of yv(·). Here for simplicity, we omit the notation of ω in each
process.
Let Ui be a nonempty convex subset of R
ki , Gt ⊆ Ft a given sub-filtration which represents the information
available to the controller, and vi(·) be the control process of player i (i = 1, 2). We denote by U
i
ad the set
of Ui-valued Gt-adapted control processes vi(·) ∈ L
2
G(0, T ;R
ki) and it is called the admissible control set for
player i (i = 1, 2). Uad = U
1
ad × U
2
ad is called the set of admissible controls for the two players. We also
introduce the following assumption:
H1. Functions b, σ, σ¯ are continuously differentiable in (x, xδ, v1, v2), f is continuously differentiable in
(x, y, z, z¯, yδ+ , v1, v2), G is continuously differentiable in x. The all the partial derivatives of b, σ, σ¯, f, G are
uniformly bounded.
Then we have the following existence and uniqueness result which can be found in [16, 17].
Theorem 2.1 If v1(·) and v2(·) are admissible controls and assumption H1 holds, the AFBSDDE (2.1)
admits a unique solution (x(·), y(·), z(·), z¯(·)) ∈ L2F (−δ, T ;R
n) × L2F (0, T + δ;R
m) × L2F (0, T ;R
m×d) ×
L2F (0, T ;R
m×d¯)
The players have their own preferences which are described as the following cost functionals
Ji(v1(·), v2(·)) = E[
∫ T
0
li(t, x
v(t), yv(t), zv(t), z¯v(t), v1(t), v2(t))dt+Φi(x
v(T )) + γi(y
v(0))].
Here li : Ω× [0, T ]×R
n×Rm×Rm×d×Rm×d¯×Rk1 ×Rk2 → R, Φi : Ω×R
n → R, γi : Ω×R
m → R(i = 1, 2)
are given continuous maps. li, Φi, and γi satisfy the following condition:
H2. Functions li, Φi, and γi are continuously differentiable with respect to (x, y, z, z¯, v1, v2), x, and y
respectively. Moreover, there exists positive constant C such that the partial derivatives of li, Φi, and γi are
bounded by C(1 + |x|+ |y|+ |z|+ |z¯|+ |v1|+ |v2|), C(1 + |x|) and C(1 + |y|) respectively.
Now we suppose that each player hopes to maximize his cost functional Ji(v1(·), v2(·)) by selecting a
suitable admissible control vi(·)(i = 1, 2). The problem is to find an admissible control (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ Uad
such that 

J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v1(·)∈U1
J1(v1(·), u2(·)),
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v2(·)∈U2
J2(u1(·), v2(·)).
(2.2)
If we can find an admissible control (u1(·), u2(·)) satisfying (2.2), then we call it a Nash equilibrium point.
In what follows, we aim to establish the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point subject
to this game problem.
3
3 Maximum principle
In this section, we will establish a necessary condition (maximum principle) and a sufficient condition (veri-
fication theorem) for problem (2.2).
Let (u1(·), u2(·)) be an equilibrium point of the game problem. Then for any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 and (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈
Uad, we take the variational control u
ǫ
1(·) = u1(·) + ǫv1(·) and u
ǫ
2(·) = u2(·) + ǫv2(·). Because both U1
and U2 are convex, (u
ǫ
1(·), u
ǫ
2(·)) is also in Uad. For simplicity, we denote by (x
uǫ1(·), yu
ǫ
1(·), zu
ǫ
1(·), z¯u
ǫ
1(·)),
(xu
ǫ
2 (·), yu
ǫ
2(·), zu
ǫ
2(·), z¯u
ǫ
2(·)), and (x(·), y(·), z(·), z¯(·)) the corresponding state trajectories of system (2.1)
with control (uǫ1(·), u2(·)), (u1(·), u
ǫ
2(·)) and (u1(·), u2(·)).
The following lemma gives an estimation of (x(·), y(·), z(·), z¯(·)).
Lemma 3.1 Let H1 hold. For i = 1, 2,
sup
0≤t≤T
E|xu
ǫ
i (t)− x(t)|2 ≤ Cǫ2,
sup
0≤t≤T
E|yu
ǫ
i (t)− y(t)|2 ≤ Cǫ2,
E
∫ T
0
|zu
ǫ
i (t)− z(t)|2dt ≤ Cǫ2,
E
∫ T
0
|z¯u
ǫ
i (t)− z¯(t)|2dt ≤ Cǫ2,
Proof. Using Itoˆ’s formula to |xu
ǫ
i (t)− x(t)|2 and Gronwall’s inequality, we draw the conclusion.
For notation simplicity, we set ζ(t) = ζ(t, x(t), xδ(t), u1(t), u2(t)) for ζ = b, σ, σ¯; f(t) = f(t, x(t), y(t),
z(t), z¯(t), yδ+(t), u1(t), u2(t)), and li(t) = li(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), z¯(t), u1(t), u2(t))(i = 1, 2).
We introduce the following variational equations:

dx1i (t) = [bx(t)x
1
i (t) + bxδ(t)x
1
i (t− δ) + bvi(t)vi(t)]dt+ [σx(t)x
1
i (t) + σxδ (t)x
1
i (t− δ)
+ σvi(t)vi(t)]dW (t) + [σ¯x(t)x
1
i (t) + σ¯xδ(t)x
1
i (t− δ) + σ¯vi(t)vi(t)]dW¯ (t),
−dy1i (t) = {fx(t)x
1
i (t) + fy(t)y
1
i (t) + fz(t)z
1
i (t) + fz¯(t)z¯
1
i (t) + E
Ft [fy
δ+
(t)y1i (t+ δ)]
+ fvi(t)vi(t)}dt− z
1
i (t)dW (t)− z¯
1
i (t)dW¯ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
x1i (t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0],
y1i (T ) = Gx(x(T ))x
1
i (T ), y
1
i (t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
(3.1)
Next, setting
φǫi(t) =
φu
ǫ
i (t)− φ(t)
ǫ
− φ1i (t), for φ = x, y, z, z¯, (i = 1, 2),
Then we can get the following two lemmas by using Lemma 3.1. The technique is classical (see Chen
and Wu [16]). Thus we omit the details and only state the main result for simplicity.
Lemma 3.2 Let H1 hold. For i = 1, 2,
lim
ǫ→0
sup
0≤t≤T
E|xǫi(t)|
2 = 0,
lim
ǫ→0
sup
0≤t≤T
E|yǫi (t)|
2 = 0,
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lim
ǫ→0
E
∫ T
0
|zǫi (t)|
2dt = 0,
lim
ǫ→0
E
∫ T
0
|z¯ǫi (t)|
2dt = 0.
Lemma 3.3 Let H1 and H2 hold. For i = 1, 2,
E
∫ T
0
[lτix(t)x
1
i (t) + l
τ
iy(t)y
1
i (t) + l
τ
iz(t)z
1
i (t) + l
τ
iz¯(t)z¯
1
i (t) + l
τ
ivi
(t)v1i (t)]dt
+ E[Φτix(x(T ))x
1
i (T )] + γ
τ
iy(y(0))y
1
i (0) ≤ 0.
(3.2)
We introduce the adjoint equation as


dpi(t) = [f
τ
y (t)pi(t) + f
τ
y
δ+
(t− δ)pi(t− δ)− liy(t)]dt+ [f
τ
z (t)pi(t)− liz(t)]dW (t)
+ [f τz¯ (t)pi(t)− liz¯(t)]dW¯ (t),
−dqi(t) = {b
τ
x(t)qi(t) + σ
τ
x(t)ki(t) + σ¯
τ
x(t)k¯i(t)− f
τ
x (t)pi(t) + E
Ft [bτxδ(t+ δ)qi(t+ δ)
+ στxδ (t+ δ)ki(t+ δ) + σ¯
τ
xδ
(t+ δ)k¯i(t+ δ)] + lix(t)}dt− ki(t)dW (t) − k¯i(t)dW¯ (t),
pi(0) =− γy(y(0)), pi(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
qi(T ) =−G
τ
x(x(T ))pi(T ) + Φix(x(T )), qi(t) = ki(t) = k¯i(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
(3.3)
This equation is also an AFBSDDE. By the existence and uniqueness result in [16, 17], we know that
(3.3) admits a unique solution (pi(t), qi(t), ki(t), k¯i(t))(i = 1, 2).
Define the Hamiltonian function Hi by
Hi(t, x, y, z, z¯, xδ, yδ+ , v1, v2; pi, qi, ki, k¯i) = 〈qi, b(t, x, xδ, v1, v2)〉+ 〈ki, σ(t, x, xδ , v1, v2)〉
+〈k¯i, σ¯(t, x, xδ, v1, v2)〉 − 〈pi, f(t, x, y, z, z¯, yδ+ , v1, v2)〉+ li(t, x, y, z, z¯, v1, v2), (i = 1, 2).
Then (3.3) can be rewritten as the following stochastic Hamiltonian system’s type:


dpi(t) = [−Hiy(t)−Hiy
δ+
(t− δ)]dt−Hiz(t)dW (t) −Hiz¯(t)dW¯ (t),
−dqi(t) = {Hix(t) + E
Ft [Hixδ (t+ δ)]}dt− ki(t)dW (t) − k¯i(t)dW¯ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
pi(0) = − γy(y(0)), pi(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
qi(T ) = −G
τ
x(x(T ))pi(T ) + Φix(x(T )), qi(t) = ki(t) = k¯i(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
where Hi(t) = Hi(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), z¯(t), xδ(t), yδ+(t), v1(t), v2(t); pi(t), qi(t), ki(t), k¯i(t)).
Theorem 3.1 Let H1 and H2 hold. Suppose that (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of our problem and
(x(·), y(·), z(·), z¯(·)) is the corresponding state trajectory. Then we have
E[〈Hivi (t), vi − ui(t)〉|G
i
t ] ≤ 0, (i = 1, 2)
for any vi ∈ Ui a.e., where (pi(·), qi(·), ki(·), k¯i(·)), (i = 1, 2) is the solution of the adjoint equation (3.3).
Proof. Apply Itoˆ’s formula to 〈q1(·), x
1
1(·)〉, we get
E〈−Gτx(x(T ))p1(T ) + Φ1x(x(T )), x
1
1(T )〉
= E
∫ T
0
[〈f τx (t)p1(t), x
1
1(t)〉 + 〈b
τ
xδ
(t)q1(t), x
1
1(t− δ)〉 − 〈E
Ft [bτxδ(t+ δ)q1(t+ δ)], x
1
1(t)〉
+ 〈στxδ (t)k1(t) + σ¯
τ
xδ
(t)k¯1(t), x
1
1(t− δ)〉 − 〈E
Ft [στxδ (t+ δ)k1(t+ δ) + σ¯
τ
xδ
(t+ δ)k¯1(t+ δ)], x
1
1(t)〉
+ 〈q1(t), bv1(t)v1(t)〉+ 〈k1(t), σv1 (t)v1(t)〉+ 〈k¯1(t), σ¯v1 (t)v1(t)〉 − 〈l1x(t), x
1
1(t)〉]dt.
(3.4)
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Noticing the initial and terminal conditions, we have
E
∫ T
0
[〈bτxδ (t)q1(t), x
1
1(t− δ)〉 − 〈E
Ft [bτxδ(t+ δ)q1(t+ δ)], x
1
1(t)〉]dt
= E
∫ T
0
〈bτxδ(t)q1(t), x
1
1(t− δ)〉dt− E
∫ T+δ
δ
〈bτxδ (t)q1(t), x
1
1(t− δ)〉dt
= E
∫ δ
0
〈bτxδ (t)q1(t), x
1
1(t− δ)〉dt − E
∫ T+δ
T
〈bτxδ (t)q1(t), x
1
1(t− δ)〉dt
= 0.
Similarly, we also have
E
∫ T
0
[〈στxδ (t)k1(t) + σ¯
τ
xδ
(t)k¯1(t), x
1
1(t− δ)〉 − 〈E
Ft [στxδ (t+ δ)k1(t+ δ) + σ¯
τ
xδ
(t+ δ)k¯1(t+ δ)], x
1
1(t)〉]dt = 0.
Apply Itoˆ’s formula to 〈p1(·), y
1
1(·)〉,
E〈p1(T ), Gx(x(T ))x
1
1(T )〉+ 〈γy(y(0)), y
1
1(0)〉
= E
∫ T
0
[〈f τy
δ+
(t− δ)p1(t− δ), y
1
1(t)〉 − 〈p1(t),E
Ft [fy
δ+
(t)y11(t+ δ)]〉
− 〈p1(t), fx(t)x
1
1(t) + fv1(t)v1(t)〉 − 〈l1y(t), y
1
1(t)〉 − 〈l1z(t), z
1
1(t)〉 − 〈l1z¯(t), z¯
1
1(t)〉]dt.
(3.5)
Noticing the initial and terminal conditions, we have
E
∫ T
0
[〈f τy
δ+
(t− δ)p1(t− δ), y
1
1(t)〉 − 〈p1(t),E
Ft [fy
δ+
(t)y11(t+ δ)]〉]dt
= E
∫ T
0
〈f τy
δ+
(t− δ)p1(t− δ), y
1
1(t)〉dt− E
∫ T+δ
δ
〈f τy
δ+
(t− δ)p1(t− δ), y
1
1(t)〉dt
= E
∫ δ
0
〈f τy
δ+
(t− δ)p1(t− δ), y
1
1(t)〉dt− E
∫ T+δ
T
〈f τy
δ+
(t− δ)p1(t− δ), y
1
1(t)〉dt
= 0.
From (3.4) and (3.5), we have
E〈Φ1x(x(T )), x
1
1(T )〉+ 〈γy(y(0)), y
1
1(0)〉
= E
∫ T
0
[〈q1(t), bv1(t)v1(t)〉 + 〈k1(t), σv1 (t)v1(t)〉+ 〈k¯1(t), σ¯v1 (t)v1(t)〉 − 〈p1(t), fv1(t)v1(t)〉
− 〈l1y(t), y
1
1(t)〉 − 〈l1z(t), z
1
1(t)〉 − 〈l1z¯(t), z¯
1
1(t)〉 − 〈l1x(t), x
1
1(t)〉]dt.
(3.6)
Substituting (3.6) into (3.2), it follows that
E
∫ T
0
〈H1v1 (t), v1(t)〉dt ≤ 0
for any v1(·) such that u1(·) + v1(·) ∈ U
1
ad. If we let ν1(·) = u1(·) + v1(·), then above equation implies that
E〈H1v1(t), ν1(t)− u1(t)〉 ≤ 0.
Furthermore, we set
6
ω1(t) = v11A + u1(t)1Ω−A, ∀v1 ∈ U1, ∀A ∈ G
1
t ,
then it is obvious that ω1(·) ∈ U
1
ad and v1(t) = (v1 − u1(t))1A. So
E[1A〈H1v1(t), v1 − u1(t)〉] ≤ 0
for any A ∈ G1t . This implies
E[〈H1v1 (t), v1 − u1(t)〉|G
1
t ] ≤ 0, a.e.
for any v1 ∈ U1.
Repeating the same process to deal with the case i = 2, we can show that the other equality also holds for
any v2 ∈ U2. Our proof is completed.
Remark 3.1 If (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of non-zero sum differential game and (u1(·), u2(·))
is an interior point of U1 × U2 for all t ∈ [0, T ], then the inequality in Theorem 3.1 are equivalent to the
following equations:
E[〈Hivi (t), vi − ui(t)〉|G
i
t ] = 0, ∀vi ∈ Ui a.e., (i = 1, 2).
On the other hand, we will aim to build a sufficient maximum principle called verification theorem for
equilibrium point under some concavity assumptions of Hi. At this moment, assumption H2 can be relaxed
to
H3. Functions li, Φi, and γi are differentiable with respect to (x, y, z, z¯, v1, v2), x, and y respectively sat-
isfying the condition that for each (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ Uad, li(·, x
v(t), yv(t), zv(t), z¯v(t), v1(t), v2(t)) ∈ L
1
F (0, T ;R).
Theorem 3.2 Let H1 and H3 hold. Let (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U
1
ad × U
2
ad be given and (x(·), y(·), z(·), z¯(·)) be the
corresponding trajectory.
Suppose
E[H1(t)|G
1
t ] = sup
v1∈U1
E[Hv11 (t)|G
1
t ],
E[H2(t)|G
2
t ] = sup
v2∈U2
E[Hv22 (t)|G
2
t ],
where
Hv11 (t) =H1(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), z¯(t), xδ(t), yδ+(t), v1(t), u2(t); p1(t), q1(t), k1(t), k¯1(t)),
Hv22 (t) =H2(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), z¯(t), xδ(t), yδ+(t), u1(t), v2(t); p2(t), q2(t), k2(t), k¯2(t)).
Suppose E[Hviivi(t)|G
i
t ] is continuous at vi = ui(t)(i = 1, 2) for any t ∈ [0, T ].
Suppose
(x, y, z, z¯, xδ, yδ+ , vi) 7→H
vi
i (t) (i = 1, 2),
x 7→Φi(x) (i = 1, 2),
y 7→γi(y) (i = 1, 2)
are concave functions respectively, and G(x) = MTx,MT ∈ R
m×n, ∀x ∈ Rn. Then (u1(·), u2(·)) is an
equilibrium point.
Proof. For any v1(·) ∈ U
1
ad, let (x
v1 (·), yv1(·), zv1(·), z¯v1(·)) be the trajectory corresponding to the control
(v1(·), u2(·)) ∈ Uad. We consider
J1(v1(·), u2(·)) − J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = A+B + C,
with
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A =E
∫ T
0
[l1(t,Θ
v1(t), v1(t), u2(t))− l1(t,Θ(t), u1(t), u2(t))]dt,
B =E[Φ1(x
v1 (T ))− Φ1(x(T ))],
C =γ1(y
v1(0))− γ1(y(0)).
where Θ(t) = (x(t), y(t), z(t), z¯(t)) and Θv1(t) = (xv1(t), yv1(t), zv1(t), z¯v1(t)).
Since γ1 is concave on y, then
C ≤ γτ1y(y(0))(y
v1(0)− y(0)).
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈p1(·), y
v1(·)− y(·)〉 and taking expectation, we get
C ≤ E
∫ T
0
[−〈p1(t), f
v1(t)− f(t)〉 − 〈H1y(t) +H1y
δ+
(t− δ), yv1(t)− y(t)〉
− 〈H1z(t), z
v1(t)− z(t)〉 − 〈H1z¯(t), z¯
v1(t)− z¯(t)〉]dt − E〈p1(T ),MT (x
v1(T )− x(T ))〉
(3.7)
where f(t) = f(t,Θ(t),EFt [yδ+(t)], u1(t), u2(t)) and f
v1(t) = f(t,Θv1(t),EFt [yv1
δ+
(t)], v1(t), u2(t)).
Due to Φ1 is concave on x, then
B ≤ EΦτ1x(x(T ))(x
v1 (T )− x(T )).
Applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈q1(·), x
v1 (·)− x(·)〉 and taking expectation, we get
B ≤ E
∫ T
0
[〈q1(t), b
v1(t)− b(t)〉+ 〈k1(t), σ
v1 (t)− σ(t)〉 + 〈k¯1(t), σ¯
v1(t)− σ¯(t)〉
− 〈H1x(t) + E
Ft [H1xδ (t+ δ)], x
v1 (t)− x(t)〉]dt + E〈M τT p1(T ), x
v1(T )− x(T )〉
(3.8)
where b(t) = b(t, x(t), xδ(t), u1(t), u2(t)) and b
v1(t) = b(t, xv1(t), xv1δ (t), v1(t), u2(t)), etc.
Moreover, we have
A = E
∫ T
0
[Hv11 (t)−H1(t)]dt− E
∫ T
0
[〈q1(t), b
v1(t)− b(t)〉+ 〈k1(t), σ
v1(t)− σ(t)〉
+ 〈k¯1(t), σ¯
v1(t)− σ¯(t)〉 − 〈p1(t), f
v1(t)− f(t)〉]dt.
(3.9)
From (3.7)-(3.9), we can obtain
J1(v1(·), u2(·))− J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = A+B + C
≤ E
∫ T
0
[(Hv11 (t)−H1(t))− 〈H1x(t) + E
Ft [H1xδ(t+ δ)], x
v1 (t)− x(t)〉
− 〈H1y(t) +H1y
δ+
(t− δ), yv1(t)− y(t)〉 − 〈H1z(t), z
v1(t)− z(t)〉 − 〈H1z¯(t), z¯
v1(t)− z¯(t)〉]dt.
Note that
E
∫ T
0
〈H1xδ (t), x
v1 (t− δ)− x(t− δ)〉dt − E
∫ T
0
〈EFt [H1xδ (t+ δ), x
v1 (t)− x(t)〉dt
= E
∫ 0
−δ
〈H1xδ (t+ δ), x
v1(t)− x(t)〉dt − E
∫ T
T−δ
〈H1xδ (t+ δ), x
v1(t)− x(t)〉dt
= 0,
due to the fact that xv1(t) = x(t) = ξ for any t ∈ [−δ, 0) and H1xδ (t) = 0 for any t ∈ (T, T + δ].
Similarly, we have
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E∫ T
0
〈H1y
δ+
(t),EFt [yv1(t+ δ)− y(t+ δ)]〉dt− E
∫ T
0
〈H1y
δ+
(t− δ), yv1(t)− y(t)〉dt
= E
∫ T+δ
T
〈H1y
δ+
(t− δ), yv1(t)− y(t)〉dt− E
∫ δ
0
〈H1y
δ+
(t− δ), yv1(t)− y(t)〉dt
= 0,
due to the fact that yv1(t) = y(t) = ϕ(t) for any t ∈ (T, T + δ] and H1y
δ+
(t) = 0 for any t ∈ [−δ, 0).
By the concavity of H1, we derive that
J1(v1(·), u2(·)) − J1(u1(·), u2(·)) ≤ E
∫ T
0
〈H1v1(t), v1(t)− u1(t)〉dt
= E
∫ T
0
E[〈H1v1 (t), v1(t)− u1(t)〉|G
1
t ]dt.
Because for any t ∈ [0, T ], v1 7→ E[H
v1
1 (t)|G
1
t ] is maximal at v1 = u(t) and H
v1
1v1
(t) is continuous at
v1 = u1(t), then we have
E[〈H1v1 (t), v1(t)− u1(t)〉|G
1
t ] ≤ 0, a.e.
It follows that
J1(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v1∈U1
J1(v1(·), u2(·)).
Repeating the same process to deal with case i = 2, we can obtain
J2(u1(·), u2(·)) = sup
v2∈U2
J2(u1(·), v2(·)).
Hence we draw the desired conclusion.
In conclusion, with the help of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we can formally solve the Nash equilibrium
point (u1(·), u2(·)). We can first use the necessary principle to get the candidate equilibrium point and then
use the verification theorem to check whether the candidate point is the equilibrium one. Let us discuss a
linear-quadratic case.
4 A linear quadratic case
In this section, we study a linear-quadratic case, which can be seen as a special case of the general system
discussed in Section 3 and aim to give a unique Nash equilibrium point explicitly. For notational simplifi-
cation, we assume the dimension of Brownian motion d = d¯ = 1 and notations are the same as the above
sections if there is no specific illustration.
Consider a linear game system with delayed and anticipated states:

dxv(t) = [A(t)xv(t) + A¯(t)xvδ (t) +B1(t)v1(t) +B2(t)v2(t)]dt + [C(t)x
v(t) + C¯(t)xvδ (t)
+D1(t)v1(t) +D2(t)v2(t)]dW (t),
−dyv(t) = [E(t)xv(t) + F (t)yv(t) +G(t)zv(t) + G¯(t)z¯v(t) + F¯ (t)yvδ+(t) +H1(t)v1(t)
+H2(t)v2(t)]dt− z
v(t)dW (t) − z¯v(t)dW¯ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xv(t) = ξ(t), t ∈ [−δ, 0],
yv(T ) = MTx
v(T ), yv(t) = ϕ(t), t ∈ (T, T + δ].
(4.1)
where all the coefficients are bounded, deterministic matrices defining on [0, T ], ξ(·) ∈ C([−δ, 0];Rn), ϕ(·) ∈
L2F (T, T + δ;R
m). For any given (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ Uad, it is easy to show know that (4.1) admits a unique
9
solution (xv(·), yv(·), zv(·), z¯v(·)). Here we only consider the case that xv(·) is driven by one Brownian motion
W (·) just for notation simplicity. All the technique and proof is similar.
In addition, two players aim to maximize their index functionals for i = 1, 2:
Ji(v1(·), v2(·)) =
1
2
E[
∫ T
0
[〈Oi(t)x
v(t), xv(t)〉+ 〈Pi(t)y
v(t), yv(t)〉+ 〈Qi(t)z
v(t), zv(t)〉
+ 〈Q¯i(t)z¯
v(t), z¯v(t)〉 + 〈Ri(t)vi(t), vi(t)〉]dt + 〈Mix
v(t), xv(t)〉+ 〈Niy
v(0), yv(0)〉].
where Oi(·), Pi(·), Qi(·), Q¯i(·) are bounded deterministic non-positive symmetric matrices, Ri(·) is bounded
deterministic negative symmetric matrices, R−1i (·) is bounded, Mi, Ni are deterministic non-positive sym-
metric matrices for i = 1, 2.
According to Theorem 3.1, the Hamiltonian function is given by
Hi(t, x, y, z, z¯, xδ, yδ+ , v1, v2; pi, qi, ki) = 〈qi, A(t)x + A¯(t)xδ +B1(t)v1 +B2(t)v2〉
+ 〈ki, C(t)x+ C¯(t)xδ +D1(t)v1 +D2(t)v2〉 − 〈pi, E(t)x + F (t)y +G(t)z + G¯(t)z¯ + F¯ (t)yδ+
+H1(t)v1 +H2(t)v2〉+
1
2
[〈Oi(t)x, x〉 + 〈Pi(t)y, y〉+ 〈Qi(t)z, z〉+ 〈Q¯i(t)z¯, z¯〉+ 〈Ri(t)vi, vi〉].
If (u1(·), u2(·)) is the Nash equilibrium point, then
ui(t) = −R
−1
i (t)[B
τ
i (t)qˆi(t) +D
τ
i (t)kˆi(t)−H
τ
i (t)pˆi(t)], t ∈ [0, T ], (i = 1, 2), (4.2)
where qˆi(t) = E[qi(t)|Gt], etc., and (pi(·), qi(·), ki(·)) is the solution of the following adjoint equation:


dpi(t) = [F
τ (t)pi(t) + F¯
τ (t− δ)pi(t− δ)− Pi(t)y(t)]dt+ [G
τ (t)pi(t)−Qi(t)z(t)]dW (t)
+ [G¯τ (t)pi(t)− Q¯i(t)z¯(t)]dW¯ (t),
−dqi(t) = {A
τ (t)qi(t) + C
τ (t)ki(t)− E
τ (t)pi(t) + E
Ft [A¯τ (t+ δ)qi(t+ δ) + C¯
τ (t+ δ)ki(t+ δ)]
+Oi(t)x(t)}dt − ki(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
pi(0) =−Niy(0), pi(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
qi(T ) =−MT pi(T ) +Mix(T ), qi(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
(4.3)
We know that the setting Gt ⊆ Ft is very general. In order to get an explicit expression of the equilibrium
point, we suppose Gt = σ{W (s); 0 ≤ s ≤ t} in the rest of this section.
We denote the filtering of state process x(t) by xˆ(t) = E[x(t)|Gt], etc, and note that E[y(t + δ)|Gt] =
E{[y(t + δ)|Gt+δ]|Gt} = E[yˆ(t + δ)|Gt]. By Theorem 8.1 in Lipster and Shiryayev [24] and Theorem 5.7
(Kushner-FKK equation) in Xiong [25], we can get the state filtering equation for (4.1):


dxˆ(t) = [A(t)xˆ(t) + A¯(t)xˆδ(t)−
2∑
i=1
Bi(t)R
−1
i (t)Bi(t)]dt+ [C(t)xˆ(t) + C¯(t)xˆδ(t)
−
2∑
i=1
Di(t)R
−1
i (t)Bi(t)]dW (t),
−dyˆ(t) = {E(t)xˆ(t) + F (t)yˆ(t) +G(t)zˆ(t) + G¯(t)ˆ¯z(t) + F¯ (t)EGt [yˆ(t+ δ)]
−
2∑
i=1
Hi(t)R
−1
i (t)Bi(t)}dt− zˆ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
xˆ(t) = ξ(t), t ∈ [−δ, 0],
yˆ(T ) = MT xˆ(T ), yˆ(t) = ϕˆ(t), t ∈ (T, T + δ].
(4.4)
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where Bi(t) = B
τ
i (t)qˆi(t) +D
τ
i (t)kˆi(t)−H
τ
i (t)pˆi(t). And the adjoint filtering equation for (4.3) satisfying


dpˆi(t) = [F
τ (t)pˆi(t) + F¯
τ (t− δ)pˆi(t− δ)− Pi(t)yˆ(t)]dt+ [G
τ (t)pˆi(t)−Qi(t)zˆ(t)]dW (t)
−dqˆi(t) = {A
τ (t)qˆi(t) + C
τ (t)kˆi(t)− E
τ (t)pˆi(t) + E
Gt [A¯τ (t+ δ)qˆi(t+ δ)
+ C¯τ (t+ δ)kˆi(t+ δ)] +Oi(t)xˆ(t)}dt− kˆi(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
pˆi(0) =−Niy(0), pˆi(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
qˆi(T ) =−MT pˆi(T ) +Mixˆ(T ), qˆi(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
(4.5)
From Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, it is easy to know that (u1(·), u2(·)) is an equilibrium point for
the above linear-quadratic game problem if and only if (u1(·), u2(·)) satisfies the expression of (4.2) with
(xˆ, yˆ, zˆ, pˆi, qˆi, kˆi)(i = 1, 2) being the solution of the coupled triple dimensions filtering AFBSDDE (4.4)-(4.5)
(TFBSDDE). Then the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point is equivalent to the existence and
uniqueness of the TFBSDDE.
However, the TFBSDDE (4.4)-(4.5) is complicated, but, in some particular cases, we can use some
transactions to relate it to a double dimensions filtering AFBSDDE, called DFBSDDE, such as the following
result.
H4. The dimension of x is equal to that of y: n = m, G¯(t) ≡ 0 and coefficients Bi(t) = Bi, Di(t) =
Di, Hi(t) = Hi are independent of time t for any i = 1, 2.
Theorem 4.1 Under H4, we assume one of the following conditions holds true:
(a) D1 = D2 = H1 = H2 ≡ 0 and BiR
−1
i B
τ
i S = SBiR
−1
i B
τ
i , (i = 1, 2);
(b) B1 = B2 = H1 = H2 ≡ 0 and DiR
−1
i D
τ
i S = SDiR
−1
i D
τ
i , (i = 1, 2);
(c) B1 = B2 = D1 = D2 ≡ 0 and HiR
−1
i H
τ
i S = SHiR
−1
i H
τ
i , (i = 1, 2),
where Sτ = A(·), A¯(·), C(·), C¯(·), E(·), F (·), F¯ (·), G(·),MT , Oi(·), Pi(·), Qi(·),Mi, Ni. Then (u1(·),u2(·)) given
by (4.2) is the unique Nash equilibrium point.
Proof. We only proof (a). The same method can be used to get (b) and (c). From above discussion,
we need to prove only that there exists a unique solution of the coupled TFBSDDE (4.4)-(4.5). In the case
that D1 = D2 = H1 = H2 ≡ 0, it becomes


dxˆ(t) = [A(t)xˆ(t) + A¯(t)xˆδ(t)−
2∑
i=1
BiR
−1
i B
τ
i qˆi(t)]dt+ [C(t)xˆ(t) + C¯(t)xˆδ(t)]dW (t),
−dyˆ(t) = {E(t)xˆ(t) + F (t)yˆ(t) +G(t)zˆ(t) + F¯ (t)EGt [yˆ(t+ δ)]}dt− zˆ(t)dW (t),
dpˆi(t) = [F
τ (t)pˆi(t) + F¯
τ (t− δ)pˆi(t− δ)− Pi(t)yˆ(t)]dt+ [G
τ (t)pˆi(t)−Qi(t)zˆ(t)]dW (t),
−dqˆi(t) = {A
τ (t)qˆi(t) + C
τ (t)kˆi(t)− E
τ (t)pˆi(t) + E
Gt [A¯τ (t+ δ)qˆi(t+ δ)
+ C¯τ (t+ δ)kˆi(t+ δ)] +Oi(t)xˆ(t)}dt− kˆi(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ]
xˆ(t) = ξ(t), t ∈ [−δ, 0]; yˆ(T ) =MT xˆ(T ), yˆ(t) = ϕˆ(t), t ∈ (T, T + δ],
pˆi(0) =−Niy(0), pˆi(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
qˆi(T ) =−MT pˆi(T ) +Mixˆ(T ), qˆi(t) = kˆi(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
(4.6)
Now we consider another DFBSDDE:
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

dx˜(t) = [A(t)x˜(t) + A¯(t)x˜δ(t)− q˜(t)]dt+ [C(t)x˜(t) + C¯(t)x˜δ(t)]dW (t),
−dy˜(t) = {E(t)x˜(t) + F (t)y˜(t) +G(t)z˜(t) + F¯ (t)EGt [y˜(t+ δ)]}dt− z˜(t)dW (t),
dp˜(t) = [F τ (t)p˜(t) + F¯ τ (t− δ)p˜(t− δ)−
2∑
i=1
BiR
−1
i B
τ
i Pi(t)y˜(t)]dt + [G
τ (t)p˜(t)
−
2∑
i=1
BiR
−1
i B
τ
i Qi(t)z˜(t)]dW (t),
−dq˜(t) = {Aτ (t)q˜(t) + Cτ (t)k˜(t)− Eτ (t)p˜(t) + A¯τ (t+ δ)EGt [q˜(t+ δ)]
+ C¯τ (t+ δ)EGt [k˜(t+ δ)] +
2∑
i=1
BiR
−1
i B
τ
i Oi(t)x˜(t)}dt− k˜(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ]
x˜(t) = ξ(t), t ∈ [−δ, 0]; y˜(T ) =MT x˜(T ), y˜(t) = ϕˆ(t), t ∈ (T, T + δ],
p˜(0) =−
2∑
i=1
BiR
−1
i B
τ
i Niy˜(0), p˜(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
q˜(T ) =
2∑
i=1
BiR
−1
i B
τ
i Mix˜(T )−MT p˜(T ), q˜(t) = k˜(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ].
(4.7)
From the commutation relation between matrices, we notice that, if (xˆ, yˆ, zˆ, pˆi, qˆi, kˆi)(i = 1, 2) is a solution
of (4.6), then (x˜, y˜, z˜, pˆ, q˜, k˜) solves (4.7), where

x˜(t) =xˆ(t), y˜(t) = yˆ(t), z˜(t) = zˆ(t),
p˜(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 pˆ1(t) +B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 pˆ2(t),
q˜(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 qˆ1(t) + B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 qˆ2(t),
k˜(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 kˆ1(t) +B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 kˆ2(t).
On the other hand, if (x˜, y˜, z˜, pˆ, q˜, k˜) is a solution of (4.7), we can let xˆ(t) = x˜(t), yˆ(t) = y˜(t), zˆ(t) = z˜(t).
Then we get (pˆi(t), qˆi(t), kˆi(t)) from the following filtering AFBSDDE:


dpˆi(t) = [F
τ (t)pˆi(t) + F¯
τ (t− δ)p˜i(t− δ)− Pi(t)yˆ(t)]dt+ [G
τ (t)pˆi(t)−Qi(t)zˆ(t)]dW (t),
−dqˆi(t) = {A
τ (t)qˆi(t) + C
τ (t)kˆi(t)− E
τ (t)pˆi(t) + A¯
τ (t+ δ)EFt [qˆi(t+ δ)]
+ C¯τ (t+ δ)EFt [kˆi(t+ δ)] +
2∑
i=1
BiR
−1
i B
τ
i Oi(t)xˆ(t)}dt− kˆi(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ]
pˆi(0) =−Niyˆ(0), pˆi(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
qˆi(T ) =−MT pˆi(T ) +Mixˆ(T ), qˆi(t) = kˆi(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
We let


p¯(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 pˆ1(t) +B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 pˆ2(t),
q¯(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 qˆ1(t) +B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 qˆ2(t),
k¯(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 kˆ1(t) +B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 kˆ2(t),
(4.8)
By Itoˆ’s formula and the uniqueness result of the solution of the SDDE and ABSDE (see [16, 17]) for
fixed (xˆ(·), yˆ(·), zˆ(·)), we have
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

p˜(t) = p¯(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 pˆ1(t) +B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 pˆ2(t),
q˜(t) = q¯(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 qˆ1(t) +B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 qˆ2(t),
k˜(t) = k¯(t) =B1R
−1
1 B
τ
1 kˆ1(t) +B2R
−1
2 B
τ
2 kˆ2(t).
(4.9)
This implies that the existence and uniqueness of (4.7) is equivalence to the existence and uniqueness of
(4.6). According to the monotonic condition in [26,27], it is easy to check the DFBSDDE (4.7) satisfies the
condition and it has a unique solution. So the TFBSDDE (4.6) admits a unique solution. We complete the
proof.
5 An example in finance
This section is devoted to study a pension fund management problem under partial information with time-
delayed surplus arising from the financial market, which naturally motivates the above theoretical research.
The financial market is the Black-Scholes market, while the pension fund management framework comes
from Federico [28]. To get close to reality, we study this problem in the case when the performance criterion
Ji(v1(·), v2(·)) is measured by a criterion involving risk. If we interpret risk in the sense of a convex risk
measure, it can be performed as a non-linear expectation called g-expectation, which can also be used to
represent a non-linear human preference in behavioral economics. See [18,19,29,30] and recent articles [12,31].
Now we introduce it in detail.
In the following, we only consider the 1-dimension case just for simplicity of notations. First, we give the
definition of convex risk measure and its connection with g-expectation.
Definition 5.1 ( [18–20] ) Let F be the family of all lower bounded FT -measurable random variables. A
convex risk measure on F is a functional ρ : F→ R such that
(a)(convexity) ρ(λX1 + (1 − λ)X2) ≤ λρ(X1) + (1− λ)ρ(X2), X1, X2 ∈ F, λ ∈ (0, 1),
(b)(monotonicity) if X1 ≤ X2 a.e., then ρ(X1) ≥ ρ(X2), X1, X2 ∈ F,
(c)(translation invariance) ρ(X +m) = ρ(X)−m, X ∈ F,m ∈ R.
The convex risk measure is a useful tool widely applied in the measurement of financial positions. The
property (a) in Definition 5.1 represents a non-linearity that illustrates the better choice for the diversified
investments; (b) means that if portfolio X2 is better than X1 under almost all scenarios, then the risk of X2
should be less than the risk of X1; (c) implies that the addition of a sure amount of capital reduces the risk
by the same amount. It is also a generalization of the concept of coherent risk measure in [21].
Consider the following BSDE: {
−dy(t) = g(t, z(t))dt− z(t)dW (t),
y(T ) = ξ.
(5.1)
Under certain assumptions, (5.1) exists a unique solution (y(·), z(·)). If we also set g(·, 0) ≡ 0, we can
make the definition as follows.
Definition 5.2 ( [29, 30] ) For each ξ ∈ FT , we call
Eg(ξ) , y(0)
the generalized expectation (g-expectation) of ξ related to g.
We can know that the expectation E is a linear expectation and does not express peoples’s preferences or
criterion involving risk, and the map ξ → Eg(ξ) includes all the properties that E has, except the linearity.
It is obvious that when g(·) = 0, Eg is reduced to the classical expectation E.
Now, we give a connection between the convex risk measure and the g-expectation.
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Definition 5.3 The risk ρ(ξ) of the random variable ξ ∈ L2F (Ω;R) (ξ can be regarded as a financial position
in the financial market) is defined by
ρ(ξ) , Eg[−ξ] = y(0),
where Eg[·] is defined in the Definition 5.2, but with ξ replaced by −ξ.
Assuming that there are two asset in the financial market for the pension fund managers to invest:

dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt,
dS1(t) = µ(t)S1(t)dt + σ(t)S1(t)dW (t),
S0(0) = 1, S1(0) > 0,
where S1(·) is a risky finance asset price and S0(·) is one risk-free asset price. µ(·) is an appreciation
rate of the asset process, and the σ(·) is the volatility coefficients. We assume that µ(·), r(·) and σ(·) are
deterministic bounded coefficients, and σ−1(·) is bounded.
Suppose that there are two pension fund managers (players) working together to invest the risk-free
and risky assets. In real financial market, it is reasonable for the investors to make decisions based on the
historical price of the risky asset S1(·). So the observable filtration can be set as Gt = σ{S1(s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t},
and it is clear that Gt = F
W
t = σ{W (s)|0 ≤ s ≤ t}. The pension fund wealth x(·) can be modeled by


dx(t) = (r(t)x(t) + (µ(t)− r(t))π(t) − α(x(t) − x(t − δ))− c1(t)− c2(t))dt + π(t)σ(t)dW (t)
+ σ¯(t)dW¯ (t),
x(0) = x0 > 0, x(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0).
(5.2)
Here we denote by π(t) the amount of portfolio invested in the risky asset at time t, and α(x(t) − x(t− δ))
represents the surplus premium to fund members or their capital transfusions depending on the performance
of fund growth during the past period with parameter α > 0 (see e.g. [32, 33]). Meanwhile, there is an
instantaneous consumption rate ci(t) for manager i(i = 1, 2). We assume that the value of x(·) is not only
affected by the risky asset, but also by some practical phenomena like the physical inaccessibility of some
economic parameters, inaccuracies in measurement, discreteness of account information, insider trading or
the information asymmetry between the manager and investors, etc (see e.g. [22, 23]). Thus we set σ¯(·) be
the instantaneous volatility, FW¯t represents the unobservable filtration generated by W¯ (·), x(t) be adapted
to the filtration Ft generated by Brownian motion (W (·), W¯ (·)), and the control processes ci(t) (i = 1, 2) be
adapted to the observation filtration Gt ⊆ Ft.
The controlled processes ci(·) (i = 1, 2) is called admissible for manager i if ci(t) > 0 is adapted to the
filtration Gt at time t, ci(t) ∈ L
2(0, T ;R), and the family of admissible control (c1(·), c2(·)) is denoted by
C1 × C2.
We assume that the insurance company hopes more terminal capital under less risk and more consumption
ci(·). According to the Definition 5.1 and 5.3, we can define the cost functional as
J
g
i (c1(·), c2(·)) = −Eg[−x(T )] + E
∫ T
0
e−βtLi
ci(t)
γ
γ
dt, i = 1, 2 (5.3)
where Li is a positive constant, β is a discount factor and 1− γ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant called the Arrow-Pratt
index of risk aversion.
Then our problem is naturally to find an equilibrium point (c∗1(·), c
∗
2(·)) ∈ C1 × C2 such that

J
g
1 (c
∗
1(·), c
∗
2(·)) = sup
c1∈C1
J
g
1 (c1(·), c
∗
2(·)),
J
g
2 (c
∗
1(·), c
∗
2(·)) = sup
c2∈C2
J
g
2 (c
∗
1(·), c2(·)).
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In the following, we set g(·) be a linear form as g(·, z(·)) = g(·)z(·) where g(·) is deterministic bounded
coefficient. Then our problem can be reformulated as


dx(t) = (r(t)x(t) + (µ(t) − r(t))π(t) − α(x(t) − x(t− δ))− c1(t)− c2(t))dt + π(t)σ(t)dW (t)
+ σ¯(t)dW¯ (t),
−dy(t) = g(t)z(t)dt− z(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
x(0) = x0, x(t) = 0, t ∈ [−δ, 0),
y(T ) = − x(T ),
(5.4)
and
J
g
i (c1(·), c2(·)) = E
∫ T
0
e−βtLi
ci(t)
γ
γ
dt− y(0), i = 1, 2. (5.5)
Now we will apply the theoretical results obtained in Section 3 to solve the above game problem. The
Hamiltonian function is in the form of
Hi(t, x(t), y(t), z(t), xδ(t), c1(t), c2(t); p(t), qi(t), ki(t), k¯i(t)) = qi(t)[r(t)x(t) + (µ(t)− r(t))π(t)
− α(x(t) − x(t− δ))− c1(t)− c2(t)] + ki(t)π(t)σ(t) + k¯i(t)σ¯(t)− p(t)g(t)z(t) + e
−βtLi
ci(t)
γ
γ
,
where the adjoint process satisfies


dp(t) = g(t)p(t)dW (t),
−dqi(t) = {(r(t)− α)qi(t) + αE
Ft [qi(t+ δ)]}dt− ki(t)dW (t) − k¯i(t)dW¯ (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
p(0) = 1,
qi(T ) = p(T ), qi(t) = ki(t) = k¯i(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
Then we use the necessary maximum principle (Theorem 3.1) to find a candidate equilibrium point:
c∗1(t) = (L
−1
1 e
rtqˆ1(t))
1
γ−1 ,
c∗2(t) = (L
−1
2 e
rtqˆ2(t))
1
γ−1 .
(5.6)
where qˆi(t) = E[qi(t)|Gt] (i = 1, 2).
Now we have to deal with qˆi(t), the optimal filtering of qi(t) on the observation Gt. We also set pˆi(t) =
E[pi(t)|Gt]. Note that
E{E[qi(t+ δ)|Ft]|Gt} = E[qi(t+ δ)|Gt] = E{E[qi(t+ δ)|Gt+δ]|Gt} = E[qˆi(t+ δ)|Gt].
Then by Theorem 8.1 in [25], we have

dpˆ(t) = g(t)pˆ(t)dW (t),
−dqˆi(t) = {(r(t)− α)qˆi(t) + αE
Gt [qˆi(t+ δ)]}dt− kˆi(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
pˆ(0) = 1,
qˆi(T ) = pˆ(T ), qˆi(t) = kˆi(t) = 0, t ∈ (T, T + δ], (i = 1, 2).
(5.7)
From (5.7), we can derive the explicit expression of pˆi(t) as
pˆ(t) = pˆi(t) = exp{
∫ t
0
g(s)dW (s)−
1
2
∫ t
0
g2(s)ds} > 0, t ∈ [0, T ],
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which is an Gt-exponential martingale.
By Theorem 5.1 in [17], we can prove qˆi(t) ≥ 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. Thus c
∗
i (t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Next, we will
solve the anticipated BSDE of qˆi(t) recursively. This method can also be found in [34, 35].
(1) When t ∈ [T − δ, T ], the ABSDE in (5.7) becomes a standard BSDE (without anticipation):
qˆi(t) = pˆ(T ) +
∫ T
t
(r(s) − α)qˆi(s)ds−
∫ T
t
kˆi(s)dW (s), t ∈ [T − δ, T ].
Obviously, we have
qˆi(t) = exp{
∫ T
t
(r(s) − α)ds}EGt [pˆ(T )] = exp{
∫ T
t
(r(s) − α)ds}pˆ(t), t ∈ [T − δ, T ].
From Proposition 5.3 in [36], (qˆi(t), kˆi(t)) is Malliavin differentiable and {Dtqˆi(t);T −δ ≤ t ≤ T } provides
a version of {kˆi(t);T − δ ≤ t ≤ T }, i.e.
kˆi(t) = Dtqˆi(t) = exp{
∫ T
t
(r(s) − α)ds}Dtpˆ(t), t ∈ [T − δ, T ].
(2) If we have solved ABSDE (5.7) on the interval [T − nδ, T − (n − 1)δ](n = 1, 2, ...), and the solution
{(qˆi(t), kˆi(t));T − nδ ≤ t ≤ T − (n − 1)δ} is Malliavin differentiable, then we continue to consider the
solvability on the next interval [T − (n+ 1)δ, T − nδ], where we can rewrite the ABSDE (5.7) as follows:
qˆi(t) = qˆi(T − nδ) +
∫ T−nδ
t
{(r(s) − α)qˆi(s) + αE
Gs [qˆi(s+ δ)]}ds−
∫ T−nδ
t
kˆi(s)dW (s).
We note that {(qˆi(s+ δ), kˆi(s+ δ)); t ≤ s ≤ T − nδ} has been solved and is Malliavin differentiable. So
the same discussion lead to {(qˆi(t), kˆi(t));T − (n+ 1)δ ≤ t ≤ T − nδ} is Malliavin differentiable, and
qˆi(t) = exp{
∫ T−nδ
t
(r(s) − α)ds}EGt [qˆi(T − nδ)] + α
∫ T−nδ
t
exp{
∫ s
t
(r(η) − α)dη}EGt [qˆi(s+ δ)]ds,
kˆi(t) = exp{
∫ T−nδ
t
(r(s) − α)ds}EGt [Dtqˆi(T − nδ)] + α
∫ T−nδ
t
exp{
∫ s
t
(r(η) − α)dη}EGt [Dtqˆi(s+ δ)]ds,
for any t ∈ [T − (n+ 1)δ, T − nδ], i = 1, 2.
We notice that all the condition in the verification theorem (Theorem 3.2) are satisfied, then Theorem
3.2 implies that (c∗1(·), c
∗
2(·)) given by (5.6) is an equilibrium point.
Proposition 5.1 The investment problem (5.2)-(5.3) admits an equilibrium point (c∗1(·), c
∗
2(·)) which is
defined by (5.6).
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